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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
From a practical standpoint, taxation of the loop deviation in
the Central Greyhound case, covering over forty percent of the
entire route, would understandably burden interstate commerce to
an unreasonable degree, whereas the degree of burden imposed
in the instant case through taxation of the loop would appear to
be so insignificant as to invoke the de minimis rule. See Brown,
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-What Now?, 48 MICH. L.
REV. 899 (1950).
In any case, the past decisions of the courts would bear out a
conclusion that in a situation involving an inconsequential loop
deviation, caused by geographical conditions, and closely related
to the intrastate traffic, the deviation itself becomes constitutionally
insignificant for taxing purposes. Therefore the taxing state need
not apportion its tax in consideration of a minor detour, but may
consider it as business carried on entirely within the state. See e. g.,
Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, supra; Lehigh Valley Ry. v.
Pennsylvania, supra; American Barge Lines v. Koontz, 136 W. Va.
747, 68 S.E.2d 56 (1951).
D. L. McC.
CONSrTIUTIONAL LAW - WITNESSES - PRIvnGFE AGAINST SEMF-
INcRIMINA O r.-A, secretary-treasurer of a labor union, was issued
a personal subpoena ad testificandum and a subpoena duces tecum
addressed to him in his official capacity as a union officer, for
appearance before a federal grand jury investigation. He failed to
produce the demanded books and records, and refused, on the
ground of self-incrimination, to answer questions pertaining to their
whereabouts; he was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt upon
his repeated refusal to answer. This conviction was upheld by the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Held,
on certiorari, that despite the fact that a custodian of records
voluntarily assumes a duty which overrides his claim of privilege
as to the records themselves, he does not thereby waive the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to oral testimony
concerning his failure to produce the records. Curcio v. United
States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
The much discussed and often maligned portion of the Con-
stitution of the United States which gives rise to the principal case
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guarantees that "no person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .. .". U.S. CONST. amend. V,
cl. 3. The privilege is not peculiar to the United States; it was, in
fact, embodied in English law centuries ago as the maxim, nemo
tenetur prodere se ipsum. Gmswou., THE 5TH Ai mmn-r TODAY
2 (1955). There is a record showing the use of such privilege as
far back as the sixteenth century. Cullier and Cullier, Cro. Eliz.
201 (1589). It was regarded as fundamental enough to warrant
inclusion in the Bill of Rights, although no similar provision appears
in earlier basic documents such as the Magna Charta or Declaration
of Independence. Hoox, COmmoN Ss. AiN rm FIrH AmND-
m 24 (1957). In recent years, its use is regarded, particularly
by the layman, as more a plaything for idle Communists and others
of their ilk than as a basic safeguard. Historically speaking, there
are three basic reasons normally given for inclusion of the privilege:
(1) it would be cruel to require one to give evidence of his own
guilt; (2) protection of the innocent; and (3) protection against
the state (particularly, from torture or other form of coercion).
The privilege is not-and has never been-considered as all-
inclusive. The places wherein it may be used include things other
than formal trial, such as appearance before a federal grand jury,
8 Wiemom, EvmEN E: 2252 (3d ed. 1940), but the use is limited.
Even confining the realm of support for this statement to cases
akin to the one under discussion, it has been held that the custodian
of corporate records may not invoke the privilege on the ground
that production might tend to incriminate the producer, personally.
Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). The same principle is applied to cus-
todians of noncorporate organization records. United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (labor union).
The principal case presents a novel twist to an old situation. It
would seem, on first inspection, to set a dangerous precedent in
that record custodians might deliberately destroy or otherwise put
beyond use the demanded records, and be immune from prosecu-
tion. This is not true; custodians in such instances are subject to
prosecution for failure to produce records demanded by subpoena
duces tecum. See Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 885 (1957);
United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950); United States v.
White, supra; Wilson v. United States, supra. In the principal case,
the citation for contempt was not for failure to produce the records,
but was for refusal to answer questions concerning this failure.
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In view of this, the problem is basically resolved into one issue:
Is this the type act which the self-incrimination provision is de-
signed to encompass?
In the United States, this has not been a provision calling for
strict interpretation. Blau v. United States, 840 U.S. 159 (1951);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Supreme Court
has stated, moreover, that "this constitutional protection must not
be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spirit", in referring to the
privilege. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1955).
This construction has not been without criticism, but appears to be
that which will be maintained in light of past decisions as well as
those more recent ones shown above. Cf. United States v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141 (1932); 8 WiGmorE, EvimDicE 2251 (3d ed. 1940).
In recent years, only one case has been considered by the Su-
preme Court which has a remotely parallel situation-the much-
cited Rogers case. Rogers v. United States, 840 U.S. 867 (1951).
In that case, the privilege was invoked as a basis for excusing re-
fusal to name the person who had custody of certain records when
one under subpoena failed to produce the records; the Supreme
Court refused to allow this. Thus, an opposite result was reached
to that in the principal case. However, the bases of decision in the
two cases were just as opposite as were the decisions themselves.
The Rogers decision was based on (1) a waiver of the privilege
through lack of timely invocation, and (2) an assumption that the
harm, i.e., self-incrimination, had already occurred. Parenthetically,
it might be stated that although the bases of decision are correct,
there is room for doubt as to their applicability to the fact pattern
in the Rogers case. United States v. Moma, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1948)
(waiver); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896) (harm al-
ready done). The Rogers case points out the difference, rather than
similarity, in the situations presented. In the principal case, the
invocation of the privilege was timely; in the Rogers case, it was
not. In the Rogers case, incrimination by self-testimony was already
present; in the principal case, it was not. Thus, the aspects treated
in the cases are truly dissimilar, even though they appear much
the same on the surface.
Prior to forming conclusions based on the preceding materials,
there is one further argument often used in this and similar cases:
Prosecution for such offenses might be hampered if the decision
were allowed to stand unchallenged. This may be rather sum-
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marily disposed of, having never been considered as a valid argu-
ment. Cf. United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758 (D.C.D.C.
1954).
In the foregoing presentation, it has appeared that (1) his-
torically speaking, the privilege against self-incrimination has been
present for not less than four hundred years; (2) despite criticism,
the privilege has not been subjected to narrow interpretation in
the United States; (8) cases similar on the surface which have
been decided in what would appear to be a contra fashion have not
been decided on the same rationale, but rely on waiver of the
privilege; and (4) even the strictest interpretation in favor of those
invoking the privilege in such instances as are presented in the
principal case will not preclude prosecution for failure to produce
the records, but merely removes the additional penalty for the
witness's refusal to convict himself from his own mouth.
In view of the above comments, it would appear that the case
as presented is novel only as to facts; the basic problem present is
still conviction of a person through his own statements. This is
precisely the situation obviously intended to be prevented, by the
very language of the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment. When regarded as such, it further appears that the provision
is not broadened by this decision, but is only affirmed as to effect.
It may be true that some guilty party may escape conviction, but
this was considered by the founders of the United States to be
preferable to a system wherein the likelihood of the guilty and
innocent being convicted was greater. Ullmann v. United States,
supra at 428. The decision of the principal case, although admittedly
allowing a freedom of action-or inaction-which may render con-
viction more difficult, seems consistent when seen as a part of a
legal system wherein the scales are deliberately weighted in favor
of the defendant in any criminal action.
C. R.S.
CGuNALx LAw-DouBLE JEOPA.DY-WArvE THEoRy DISAP-
PnovD.-D was tried under an indictment charging arson in the first
count and first degree murder in the second count. As to the sec-
ond count, the trial judge instructed the jury as to both first and
second degree murder. The jury returned a verdict finding D guilty
of arson under the first count and second degree murder under the
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